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Abstract
We examine the individual-level determinants of tax morale in low-capacity states,
specifically Latin American countries, where the social contract is often perceived as
fractured. We argue that individuals in such states perceive the social contract as an
agreement to which they can opt in or opt out. Those who choose to opt out prefer
to substitute state-provided goods for private providers, rather than pay for public
goods through taxes or free-ride to receive those goods. Through a list experiment
conducted in Mexico City, we demonstrate that willingness to evade taxes is highest
when individuals have stepped outside of the social contract. More traditional indi-
cators of reciprocity – such as socio-economic status and perceptions of corruption –
are not significant. We bolster our experimental results with observational data from
seventeen Latin American cities; those with access to employer-sponsored insurance
are more willing to evade tax.
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1 Introduction
At the center of every functioning state is some form of social contract. This is, in essence, an
agreement between citizens and the state. The state is tasked with providing public goods,
and in return, citizens willingly cede liberty and taxes to the state (Rousseau, 1920). In
theory, the bilateral nature of this contract is naturally self-reinforcing. On the one hand,
the state cannot provide public goods without sufficient tax revenue. On the other hand,
tax morale rests on the foundation of a strong social contract. Indeed, Margaret Levi (1989,
p. 52-53) maintains that tax compliance thrives where “taxpayers have confidence that (1)
rulers will keep their bargains and (2) the other constituents will keep theirs.” Taxpayers
comply with their end of the social contract when they perceive an honest, responsible state
and an engaged, conscientious citizenry.
While the state’s ability to provide public goods has received considerable attention in
academic literature (e.g Kurtz, 2013; McGuire, 2014; Bird and Zolt, 2015; Soifer, 2015), the
individual-level dimension of the social contract, notably tax morale, has generated only
limited research thus far (e.g. Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Duch and
Solaz, 2015; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017) and remains largely unexplored in developing countries
(Torgler, 2005; Bergman, 2010; Ortega et al., 2016). Indeed, the literature largely neglects
the fact that the conditions of a functioning social contract often do not hold in developing
or low-capacity states. In such states, public goods provision is often poor, management
of public funds is often corrupt or inefficient, and tax evasion is historically high. In these
contexts, where the social contract appears fractured, is it not clear what drives citizens to
maintain their end of the bargain or, specifically, what drives variation in their willingness
to underwrite the arrangement through the payment of taxes.
Tax morale in low-capacity states remains largely unexplored, with some significant ex-
ceptions. Bergman (2010), for example, suggests that levels of enforcement, together with
reciprocity, are especially important in low-capacity states. Bodea and LeBas (2016) argue
that, in the absence of strong enforcement, pro-compliance norms are a function of social
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context, which can act as a substitute for poor quality in state service provision. These
theories, while important, struggle to account for individual-level differences where context
is held constant, and more importantly, they neglect to consider the agency that citizens
exert over the social contract.
This paper examines the individual-level determinants of tax morale in low-capacity
states, specifically Latin American countries, where norms of tax compliance are weak and
public goods provision is often poor. We argue that individuals in such states perceive the
social contract as an agreement to which they can opt in or opt out. If individuals believe
that their government can provide public goods efficiently and successfully, relative to private
providers, they are more likely to fulfill their end of the contract by paying tax. However,
individuals may also opt out of the social contract – in doing so, they take actions to reduce
their dependence on state-provided goods and also evade taxes. To neatly capture this idea
of opting in and out of the social contract, we focus specifically on the divergence in attitudes
towards tax compliance among Latin American citizens who opt out of the public system and
purchase private health insurance in comparison to those who remain in the public system.
The primary test of our argument is based on data from an original survey experiment
fielded in Mexico. Mexico suffers from high rates of tax evasion: income tax evasion rates
are higher than 80% among small firms, corporate income tax evasion rates are decreasing
but still higher than 25%, and VAT evasion rates are higher than 20% (Go´mez Sabaini and
Jime´nez, 2012). In 2015, tax evasion in Mexico represented about 3% of GDP (ECLAC, 2017)
and official estimates suggest that personal tax evasion in Mexico fluctuated between 15% and
19% between 2004 and 2012 (Fuentes Castro et al., 2013). Individual-level survey data from
the AmericasBarometer indicates that, while in general, the attitudes of citizens towards
their state is poor, there is notable heterogeneity in these attitudes (Romero et al., 2015).
Observational studies on tax compliance however, will likely suffer from social desirability
bias, given the sensitive nature of questions about tax evasion (Bradburn et al., 1978).
Therefore, we use a list experiment to elicit willingness to evade taxes.
3
We find robust evidence that tax morale is lowest among individuals who have stepped
outside of the social contract (out of the welfare state) and, instead, opt for private providers.
Among those who opt out, roughly 20% to 30% express a willingness to evade taxes. Mean-
while, we find limited support for alternative hypotheses on reciprocity. Specifically, we do
not find that individuals are more willing to evade taxes when they are wealthy or perceive
higher rates of corruption. These findings suggest that individuals do not simply evade taxes
when the expected benefits are low; individuals evade taxes after they distance themselves
from state-provided goods and opt for privately provided substitutes. When we explore this
argument in a larger comparative setting, with data from seventeen Latin American cities,
we find further evidence that opting out is a key driver of tax morale. This evidence suggests
that those with access to employer-sponsored insurance, or who are independent from state
social security, are much more likely to report a willingness to evade taxes.
This paper makes a number of contributions. It has implications for work on state
capacity more generally (Kurtz, 2013; Soifer, 2015) together with work on the shape and
evolution of tax structures across Latin America (e.g. Centeno, 1997; Wibbels and Arce, 2003;
Ardanaz and Scartascini, 2013; Hart, 2010; Schneider, 2013; Bird and Zolt, 2015; Fairfield,
2015; Castan˜eda, 2017; Castan˜eda and Doyle, 2019). More specifically, we contribute to the
burgeoning literature on the individual-level determinants of tax compliance (e.g. Bergman,
2010; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Duch and Solaz, 2015; Ballard-Rosa
et al., 2017) by focusing our attention on states where the benefits of paying taxes are not
self-evident and, often, not desired. The importance of examining tax morale under such
conditions cannot be overstated. It is in these cases where taxes are most necessary, as
public goods are in greatest need of improvement, but at the same time, tax morale is most
precarious.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section discusses the literature on state ca-
pacity and connects it to the scholarly debate on tax morale, before we present our argument.
The second section presents our research design. In particular, we discuss the advantages of
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using population-based list experiments for the study of tax compliance. The third section
presents the results of the list experiment we fielded in Mexico City to evaluate the effect of
reciprocity on tax morale. We then examine a larger comparative set of data from seventeen
Latin American cities to further bolster our results. Our final section concludes.
2 Taxation, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract
Although variation in state capacity has long been of interest to researchers, especially in the
Latin American context (e.g. O’Donnell, 1993), recently there has been a renewed interest
in the historical institutional roots of state capacity. Rejecting the bellicose accounts of
European state formation (e.g. Tilly, 1992), these neo-institutionalist accounts emphasize key
junctures in Latin American history, which have shaped the means by which centralized state
building processes, which incorporated previously peripheral or ‘brown’ areas (O’Donnell,
1993), were able to occur successfully (e.g. Kurtz, 2013; Soifer, 2015). In this work, state
capacity is conceptualized at the macro-level as institutional power – that is, the ability of
the state to induce citizens and organizations within its borders to pay tax (e.g. Kurtz, 2013).
This macro-level will be endogenous to the micro-level dimension of state capacity, manifest
in the perceived legitimacy of the state by its citizens combined with their willingness to pay
these taxes and serve in the military (Kurtz, 2013; Bird and Zolt, 2015, p. 3). In essence,
state capacity, as understood in this sense, is a contractarian bargain between the state and
its citizens - a social contract (Rousseau, 1920). The state provides public goods, and in
turn, citizens are willing to pay tax to facilitate this exchange.
Within the Latin American context, most work has focused on explanations for the
variation in the provision of public goods, which is notoriously uneven (e.g. O’Donnell, 1993;
McGuire, 2014). However, some work has recently begun to focus on the other side of
the equation - taxation - and the often uneven and regressive form that taxation assumes
across the region (e.g. Wibbels and Arce, 2003; Hart, 2010; Ardanaz and Scartascini, 2013;
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Schneider, 2013; Fairfield, 2015; Bird and Zolt, 2015; Castan˜eda, 2017; Flores-Mac´ıas, 2018;
Castan˜eda and Doyle, 2019). Most of this burgeoning literature has focused on the macro-
level determinants of taxation and cross-country variation in Latin America more generally.
Literature on the micro-level dimension of the social contract – that is, the willingness
of citizens to pay tax and engage in a reciprocal exchange with the state – has begun
to coalesce around a number of explanations for individual tax morale. Recent work has
demonstrated that willingness to pay tax is conditioned by individual personality traits, such
as honesty, positive self-image, national pride, and democratic values (Luttmer and Singhal,
2014; Dwenger et al., 2016) and observable factors such as individuals’ position in the income
spectrum (Duch and Solaz, 2015). The literature on tax compliance also highlights the
relevance of peer effects for tax morale (Frey and Torgler, 2007; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).
According to this literature, individuals may wish to conform to the behavior of relatives,
close friends, or acquaintances and so therefore, peer compliance directly affects individual
willingness to pay taxes (Castro and Scartascini, 2015; Carrillo et al., 2017; Del Carpio,
2014).
One key explanation centers on the threat of sanction for evading taxes (see Allingham
and Sandmo, 1972; Slemrod, 2018). Luttmer and Singhal (2014), in their review of the state-
of-the-art, indicate that the threat of punishment appears to have a more robust effect on
tax compliance in comparison to all other explanations. Bergman (2010) however, suggests
that legal sanctions are insufficient to motivate compliance in Latin America. He argues
that tax evasion is more rampant in Argentina than Chile because taxpayers in Argentina
do not believe that evasion will be effectively punished. Low levels of capacity to pursue
evasion through legal mechanisms means that taxpayers may not perceive threats of sanction
as realistic, so these threats may not dominate individual decisions about compliance. Other
considerations will become important.
Behind much of the literature on individual tax morale is one such consideration: the
individual’s perception of reciprocity (Frey and Torgler, 2007; Daude et al., 2013; Castro
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and Scartascini, 2015; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017; Carrillo et al., 2017; Cullen et al., 2018).
Reciprocity refers to the belief among citizens that in paying taxes, the government will
provide some tangible public good in return, and that the government can provide this good
efficiently and successfully. Building on the insights of Levi (1989), it is widely established
that the decision not to free-ride is under-girded by a strong element of rational calculation;
citizens are quasi-voluntarily compliant because they believe that they are benefiting from
the tax contract. As Levi (1989) contends, “without a perceived benefit, there is absolutely
no reason for a rational actor even to consider assuming the costs of taxation” (p. 56).
Quasi-voluntary compliance can be established however, not only when citizens perceive
that they are receiving benefits from their fiscal contract with the state, but also when rulers
can demonstrate that the tax public goods provision is efficient or fair (see also Bergman,
2010).
Where citizens believe that paying taxes to the government results in some direct and
valuable reciprocal benefit for them personally, their willingness to pay taxes will be higher.
Individuals will weigh the marginal utility they derive from public goods funded by their
personal taxes, versus the return they would receive if they were to pay for this public good
privately. This will inevitably be shaped by their perceptions of the quality of this public
good and how efficient and capable state provision actually is (Daude et al., 2013; Kuziemko
et al., 2015; Ortega et al., 2016).
Consider the case of Britain’s first income tax introduced in 1799. Quasi-voluntary tax
compliance was engendered because the British government assured its citizenry that it
would use these funds for the stated purpose of not only fighting the Napoleonic Wars,
but also doing so successfully. As Levi argued, the government provided assurances that
everybody would pay their fair share and that tax collectors would be honest; “assurances
of progressivity, protections of privacy, and public confidence that there would be little
administrative waste, corruption, or mismanagement were the prerequisites, the conditions,
for quasi-voluntary compliance” (Levi, 1989, p. 138). Concerns about the return in public
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goods, fairness, and efficiency, remain crucial determinants of tax morale, over two hundred
years later. In short, “quasi-voluntary compliance rests on reciprocity” (Levi, 1989, p.69).
More recently Scheve and Stasavage (2016) argue that, after the two world wars, marginal
tax rates (and compliance) increased in the UK and the US because there was a political
consensus to promote compensatory/redistribution mechanisms.
As a consequence, ever since Margaret Levi’s seminal Of Rule and Revenue (Levi, 1989),
the importance of beliefs about reciprocity have been central to the literature. Bergman
(2010), Doerrenberg and Peichl (2013), Beramendi and Rehm (2016) and Ballard-Rosa et al.
(2017) have all subsequently demonstrated that the willingness to pay taxes is conditioned
upon the degree to which individuals perceive public goods provision to be fair, while Daude
et al. (2013), Kuziemko et al. (2015) and Ortega et al. (2016) have focused on how tax morale
is shaped by whether or not citizens believe the government has the ability to effectively
deliver public goods. Others have emphasized the importance of whether citizens believe
they will receive some form of reciprocal benefit in return for paying tax (Daude et al., 2013;
Castro and Scartascini, 2015; Carrillo et al., 2017; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017) and there is
also a small body of evidence indicating that the payment of tax can encourage citizens to be
more willing to hold their government to account, at least in Indonesia and Uganda (Paler,
2013; Martin, 2014).
The central point to take from this handful of studies is that the success of the social
contract, and tax morale from the perspective of individual citizens, is predicated upon
notions of reciprocity. That is, citizens will be wiling to pay tax if they believe their state
has the ability to provide effective and fair public goods from which they will benefit.
2.1 Tax Morale and Opting Out
Our argument builds directly on this work. We expect that the willingness to pay tax will
be a function of reciprocity, such that tax morale will be highest among those who expect to
benefit personally from public goods. However, we maintain that reciprocity might operate
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differently in low-capacity states than existing scholarship would suggest. In low-capacity
states, where public services may be underfunded or perceived as poor quality, citizens are
not passive surveyors of the marketplace who pay taxes for public goods or who free-ride
to receive those goods. Indeed, the notion of free-riding has limited traction in contexts
where: 1) citizens are not necessarily eager to obtain access to state-provided public goods,
which are often perceived as under-funded or inferior; 2) it is not widely assumed that other
citizens are contributing their share of taxes to those goods; and 3), the state has limited
capacity to properly enforce taxation. In such conditions, citizens may be more hesitant to
abide by their end of the social contract, as it appears that the state and fellow citizens are
not abiding by theirs.
At the same time, tax morale does not depend exclusively on the perceived quality of
public goods, but also on the relative abundance of private substitutes for under-provided
public goods (Cowell and Gordon, 1988). Unlike highly developed welfare states (where
private options are only for the very rich and the private market is very small), in weakly de-
veloped welfare states, many private options have flourished to replace public health services,
education, and even security (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). In these contexts, private substitutes
for public goods could be highly competitive and affordable. Even low income individuals
have private options available.
Because of the fragile nature of the social contract and the abundance of outside alter-
natives, we need to rethink how individual taxpayers in low-capacity states conceptualize
the social contract and the impact of this on tax evasion. We argue that individuals in such
contexts may consider the option to opt out of this tenuous bargain with the state. Rather
than using what they perceive as low quality services, and receiving those goods by either
paying taxes or free-riding, they may substitute public goods with privately provided alter-
natives. Because these individuals prefer not to take advantage of public goods, they are
consequently less willing to fund those goods through the payment of taxes. And given that
the threat of sanction may not always be credible in low capacity contexts (e.g. Bergman,
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2010) opting out of the tax contract may be a real and relatively low risk option. As such,
we argue that tax morale is a function of the individual’s decision to remain in contract with
the state or to opt out, a decision that will be contingent on state capacity.1 Where the
state has greater capacity to provide public goods of high quality, then the incentive to opt
out and pursue private alternatives to these public goods will not be as large. In contrast,
where the state has lower capacity to provide public goods, the incentive to opt out will be
higher, and the incentive to pay taxes lower.
Similar to existing research on reciprocity, we expect that income and self-interest will
condition preferences for taxation (e.g. Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016). While we anticipate
that tax morale will be lowest among individuals – at any level of income – who deliberately
opt out from state-provided services, we do not necessarily expect the size of this effect to
be consistent across all income groups. Wealthier individuals, who can access high quality
private alternatives to public goods, are likely to have lower tax morale. Poorer individuals,
particularly in contexts with truncated and regressive public goods provision, are also likely
to have low tax morale. Such individuals may be forced to opt out because of deficiencies
in the public goods they do receive (see Cotlear et al., 2015), or they may prefer to rely on
a charity sector that effectively replaces state provision. In contrast, middle income groups,
which have traditionally been fully incorporated into functioning contributory public goods
regimes in Latin America, are likely to exhibit slightly higher tax morale among those who
opt out. For individuals in this group, the public goods they receive are probably of high
quality and generally better than the alternatives they could afford via private provision.
Nonetheless, as individuals view taxes as part of a social contract in which tax payments
are made in exchange for services provided by the state (Daude et al., 2013; Castro and
Scartascini, 2015; Beramendi and Rehm, 2016; Ortega et al., 2016), we expect that those
who do opt out of public goods provision will have lower tax morale.2
1Table A.7 in the appendix provides some empirical evidence that opting out is indeed contingent on
state capacity.
2There will also be those individuals who continue to use state provided services, but who also evade tax
- the free-riders. We are not explicitly interested in this group and do not capture them in our empirical
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To illustrate our theory of opting out, we will consider a classic example: healthcare. If
an individual perceives state provided health care to be of high quality, as well as easy and
efficient to access, then it is not hard to imagine that this individual would be more willing
to pay tax to fund this system. An individual who perceives state provided health care to be
of poor quality, inefficient, costly and difficult to access, relative to private providers in the
market, would probably forbear taxation and the social contract. Rather than free-ride for
what is deemed an inferior service, she is likely to use her money to purchase private health
care instead.
This is particularly pertinent for Latin America, where there is significant variation in the
manner that welfare and tax regimes have evolved. There is even a great deal of heterogeneity
among citizens within the same state in the degree to which they have been incorporated
into a functioning social contract. Some Latin American welfare regimes, which are mostly
funded by contributory taxation schemes (McGuire, 2014), are regressive and narrow in
their focus, mainly because they evolved in response to the concentration of risk among a
particular sector of the labor force during the period of import substitution industrialization
(Wibbels and Ahlquist, 2011). The coverage and quality of the delivery of public goods by
the state has been further undermined by a region-wide move towards the privatization of
social and health insurance institutions throughout the 1990s (Brooks, 2009).
In turn, this dynamic has had an endogenous effect on the willingness of citizens to engage
with the state. Recent evidence suggests that in some Latin American countries, citizens
have increasingly decided to opt out of the social contract (Ferreira et al., 2012). This has
largely been attributed to newly emerging middle class groups, either because they have
traditionally not been incorporated into the state or because of a general perception that
the quality of public goods provision is poor and sub-standard. They send their children to
private schools, employ private security guards, and purchase private social insurance cover
(Ferreira et al., 2012). They are not willing to enter into a social contract with the state
analysis.
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simply because they believe they a) do not receive reciprocal benefits from the state or b)
that the quality of public goods provision is so poor that they are better off seeking private
solutions.
We focus on private health insurance as a good proxy for the sense of reciprocity we
are interested in here. We think that private insurance, particularly in Latin America, can
succinctly capture the type of cost-benefit calculation we discussed above. These are citizens
who choose to pay for private health care over, or in addition to, publicly-provided health
goods, and the assumption is that they do so because they perceive public provision to be
inferior to private provision. We expect that their willingness to engage in a reciprocal social
contract with the state will be lower than those who utilize state-provided public goods.
Of course, it is possible that citizens might use private health care, yet still rely on the
state for other types of public goods, such as security. For example, Rueda and Stegmueller
(2016) demonstrate that wealthy individuals in highly unequal regions of Europe are more
likely to support redistribution, compared to the wealthy in more equal regions of Europe.
Support for redistribution is due to the externalities of inequality; wealthy individuals believe
that higher inequality is more likely to result in them becoming victims of crime, so they
perceive redistribution as a means to mitigate security risks. In unequal, low capacity states,
however, the dynamic is likely to be different. In Mexico, for example, Flores-Macias and
Sa´nchez-Talanquer (2019) demonstrate that those with the highest levels of concern with
crime are less willing to contribute more income in taxes. They argue that “individuals
would rather not commit additional resources towards state institutions considered weak,
ineffective or corrupt” (p. 11). In Colombia, Flores-Mac´ıas (2014) has argued that it was
possible to raise taxes among the elite only because the elite’s perception of the government’s
provision of public safety improved. In low capacity states therefore, we believe that opting
out of one public good, such as state health care, is indicative of a general sentiment about
the state’s inability and lack of capacity to provide reasonable and effective public goods in
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other areas.3 In essence, we are testing the degree to which citizens are willing to opt out of
the social contract.4
3 Research Design
Our study is one of the first to use list experiments to explore tax morale in developing
countries (see also Fergusson et al., 2017). Our empirical analysis is based on an original
survey with a representative sample of a large, urban center in a developing economy. Fur-
thermore, our data are not limited to outcome data on tax revenue; we use list experiments
to elicit willingness to evade taxes, a technique that has been found to provide more accurate
estimates than self-reports for a wide range of sensitive topics (Blair and Imai, 2012; Glynn,
2013).
Our survey was fielded in 2017, and it consists of 1,100 face-to-face interviews in Mexico
City. The surveys were conducted on tablets using the Qualtrics off-line application to allow
for complete randomization and customization. Our sample was drawn from a sampling
frame provided by the Mexican statistics office (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa
- INEGI ), managed by the local polling firm that implemented our survey (Beltran, Juarez
y Asociados - BGC ), and includes individuals from all levels of income.
The case of Mexico is particularly relevant for the study of tax compliance in developing
countries. Mexico is ranked 35th out of 35 OECD countries in terms of tax-to-GDP ratio.
Total tax revenue in Mexico was only 16.2% of GDP in 2017 and has increased only four
percentage points in the past 17 years (OECD, 2019). In fact, the tax burden in Mexico is
one of the lowest in Latin America (OECD, 2019), and it is also quite low in comparison with
countries of similar levels of economic development in other regions of the world. Tax evasion
3Public health insurance in Mexico is particularly useful in this regard as each public insurance sub-
system has evolved to include other aspects of social security and as such, public health cover in Mexico is
very much intertwined with wider public goods provision.
4Many citizens, particularly in contexts of universal public goods provision, will still have access to the
state system and yet purchase additional private insurance. By choosing to pay for private insurance, they
clearly view the public system as deficient.
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is one of the main determinants of Mexico’s poor fiscal performance. In 2015, the federal
government lost around US$1.4 billion for VAT evasion alone (ECLAC, 2017). Additionally,
the Mexican tax base is limited because a significant proportion of the economically active
population remains in the informal labor market; around 58% according to the 2014 Mexican
employment survey (Alcaraz et al., 2015).
But most importantly, simple measures of intrinsic attitudes and beliefs about reciprocity
are also quite low in Mexico. For example, the results of the most recent AmericasBarometer
survey in Mexico show that 83% of Mexicans think that corruption is a generalized problem;
about 53% have little, or very little, trust in the federal government; only 8% positively
evaluate the role of the government in fighting corruption; and only 34% are satisfied with
democracy (Romero et al., 2015).
3.1 Eliciting Preferences for Tax Evasion
Our dependent variable, tax morale, presents a methodological challenge for analysis. Tra-
ditionally, scholars measure tax morale by asking people if they are willing to pay taxes or
if they are willing to pay additional taxes as a response to changes in policies. From this
perspective, scholars seek to evaluate individual responses to policy or informational stim-
ulus (e.g. Castro and Scartascini, 2015; Ortega et al., 2016). Some other studies focus on
ethical or moral issues and the individual propensity to evade taxes (Luttmer and Singhal,
2014). From this point of view, it seems more important to understand the mechanisms
that explain why individuals cheat or find cheating on taxes justifiable (e.g. Duch and Solaz,
2015). In any case, these type of direct questions on tax practices are quite susceptible to
social desirability bias.
We use a list experiment to measure individual willingness to pay taxes (see Blair and
Imai, 2012; Glynn, 2013). List experiments enable us to measure support for taboo or
illicit behaviors while, at the same time, protecting respondents’ anonymity (e.g. De Jonge
and Nickerson, 2014). The list experiment procedure is straightforward. Respondents are
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presented with a hypothetical scenario, and they are instructed to reveal (only) the number
of responses they would support, but not which responses they would consider. Half of the
respondents are randomly assigned to a control group, and the other half to a treatment
group. The only difference between these two groups is the inclusion of a theoretically
important sensitive item, which is only included in the treatment list.
It might be argued that a list experiment is not necessary to measure tax evasion, given
that Mexican citizens would not fear any punishment for reporting a willingness to evade
taxes. However, when we compare self-reported tax compliance with actual tax compliance,
we see an interesting trend: Mexican citizens tend to over-report willingness to evade taxes.
In a 2013 survey conducted by the Servicio de Administracio´n Tributaria (SAT), as many
as 33% of Mexicans said it was justifiable to cheat and not pay taxes. For some forms of
tax evasion, such as paying in cash to avoid VAT, approximately 65% believed evasion was
justifiable. These estimates are very high, compared to the actual rates of evasion (SAT,
2013). Therefore, we believe that our list experiment closely captures genuine preferences
for tax evasion and alleviates the possibility of under- or over-reporting.
In our survey instrument, respondents were shown “a list of [three/four] things that
people would do to save money.” They were asked: “How many of these things would you
consider doing to save money? Your answer must be a number.” The enumerator listed three
potential control responses: “spend less money on groceries each week,” “steal some money,”
and “look for an additional job.” Half of the respondents were randomly assigned to this
control group.The other half of the respondents were randomly assigned to the treatment
group, to which the survey enumerator displayed the three potential responses listed above
as well as a fourth, sensitive item. In this case, the treatment group list included an option
to Not pay your taxes.
An alternative to this sensitive item would be a more specific example of tax evasion,
such as not paying VAT or personal income taxes. However, our pre-tests indicated that
many individuals were confused about specific taxes. They were often uncertain about
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which taxes applied to them or what were the specific strategies that one could use to
evade. To avoid such confusion, we elected to use a more generic sensitive item, which was
widely understood throughout the subject pool. Under conditions of perfect randomization,
the difference between the average number of items in the treatment and control groups
represents the percentage of the sample that would support the illegal/sensitive behavior.
The baseline list was specifically designed, based on best practice for list experiments, to
ameliorate design effects as well as strategic error on behalf of the respondents (Glynn, 2013).
First, it is important that the presence of the sensitive item does not change the composition
of the list as a whole (Blair and Imai, 2012). Perhaps an item is somewhat controversial in
the context of the baseline list, but appears mild in comparison with the sensitive item in
the treatment list. In order to prevent such a design effect, our baseline list includes a low-
prevalence item (stealing some money) that is likely considered to be more taboo than the
sensitive item. The list was also designed to reduce the probability of strategic misreporting,
which can occur if a respondent perceives that her support for the sensitive item is somehow
revealed in her answer. We attempted to mitigate this concern by incorporating baseline
items that are negatively correlated with one another (Glynn, 2013). Specifically, we expect
that the type of person who is hard-working enough to consider looking for an additional job
and responsible enough to spend less money on groceries is unlikely to support petty theft.
Before reporting results from the statistical analysis, we will assess the degree to which
the list experiment accurately elicited support for tax evasion. We statistically test for design
effects using the ict.test function in the R list package (Imai, 2011). With a Bonferroni
correction for multiple testing, our minimum p-values fail to reject the null hypothesis of
no design effects for experiments. The response distribution in the control group indicate
that we were largely successful in designing a list where few people would fear revealing
their support for the sensitive item by supporting all items in the baseline list. Only 4% of
respondents in the control group selected zero items from the list, and only 1% of the control
group selected all items available. This suggests that individuals were not likely to suppress
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their support of the sensitive item for fear of revealing their preferences. Furthermore, the
similar proportions of the treatment and control lists lend face validity to the test failing to
identity design effects. Taken together, we believe that the list experiment was well designed
to capture true preferences.
The list experiment is not the only experimental design that allow survey researchers
to measure support for sensitive items. Another viable option – the randomized response
technique – tends to result in even less bias (Rosenfeld et al., 2016). Both techniques are
vulnerable to strategic error, whereby respondents lie to conceal their preferences, and non-
strategic error, where respondents misunderstand the technique or fail to see how the design
maintains their anonymity. For our study, we preferred the list experiment for considerations
of non-strategic error. Non-strategic error and difficulties in implementation can be highly
problematic, especially in developing country contexts where formal education cannot be
taken for granted (Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson, 2014; Ahlquist, 2018). We found that
the randomized response technique, which requires respondents to have a basic understanding
of probability and randomization, was too cognitively arduous for our respondent pool and
made it difficult for them to answer questions.
After extensive pre-testing, we incorporated specific implementation accommodations for
our list experiment to reduce non-strategic error. First, we devoted a substantial portion
of enumerator training to the use and purpose of list experiments. We conducted several
mock interviews and highlighted which respondent behaviors were unacceptable. Second, we
explained our instructions in greater detail in the survey instrument and specifically stated
that the appropriate response would be a numerical sum. Third, we included a dry-run
list experiment in the survey instrument, which walked the respondent through a simple
example. Finally, we used show-cards to identify the list items and response options, and we
specifically instructed enumerators not to read any of the lists aloud unless the respondent
required assistance. In the field, enumerators read the prompt, presented the showcard, and
the respondents considered the list privately until they gave their answer.
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3.2 Publicly or Privately Provided Services
In order to test our main hypothesis on opting out of publicly provided services, we wish to
know whether or not respondents substitute or compliment state-sponsored health care for
private providers. Since 1983, the Mexican constitution has guaranteed health care to all
its citizens, which is provided through a number of different public providers. Individuals
have no control over their public provider as affiliation is determined by occupation. Those
with private salaried employment (and beneficiaries) have their health care covered by the
Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS). Those who work for the federal government
are covered by the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado
(ISSSTE), and there are also additional specific publicly funded insurance schemes for those
working in PEMEX and other select state entities. All those without coverage under the
programs above, are entitled to coverage with Seguro Popular (SP), which extends publicly
funded health insurance to nearly 50 million Mexican citizens (OECD, 2016, p. 57).5 Private
health insurers and private hospitals also operate widely in Mexico. In fact, with 11.4
publicly owned and 28.6 privately owned hospitals per million population, “Mexico displays
the highest ratio of private to public sector facilities across OECD countries” (OECD, 2016,
p. 63). Furthermore, the Mexican health system is best understood as a series of health care
subsystems. Each major provider of health care, including the four major public providers,
IMSS, ISSSTE, PEMEX and Seguro Popular, together with private insurers, operates and
owns its own clinics and hospitals. In effect, each one is a distinct health system (OECD,
2016, p. 55).
According to the most recent census data published in 2015, 23.1% of the covered popu-
lation had access to services provided by private institutions, 36.8% to health care services
provided by public social security institutions, and 40.1% to the National System for Social
Protection (INEGI, 2010, 2015). The same sources indicate that approximately 17% of the
Mexican population remain unaffiliated to any of these public plans (this figure is 21.5 per
5Or other area specific targeted programs such as Cl´ınicas de la Ciudad de Me´xico.
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cent according to the OECD).6 It is also important to note that the proportion of users of
private health care services is higher in Mexico City where, according to census data, 27.75%
of the population is affiliated to private health insurance schemes (INEGI, 2010). Across the
country, most use of private health services is through private insurance and out of pocket
spending (see OECD, 2016).
In our questionnaire, we asked respondents whether or not they were affiliated to any of
the major public health services (e.g. Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), Instituto
de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE), Secretar´ıa de
Salud, Institutos de Nutricio´n, Neurolog´ıa, o Cancerolog´ıa, Seguro Popular, Cl´ınicas de la
Ciudad de Me´xico). We also asked them a separate question about their use of private health
insurance, as many of those in our sample who opt out with private health insurance are also
covered by one of the public insurance schemes. Our main independent variable therefore,
is based on the following question: “Do you have any private medical insurance?”, where all
those who answered yes were coded as 1, and all those who answered no were coded as 0.7
A focus on opting out of public health insurance in Mexico City is particularly useful in
this context. In 1943, with the creation of the Ministry of Health, IMSS was founded not
only to provide health cover for formal sector workers, but also pensions for old age and
disability, insurance against occupational risk and even child care services (OECD, 2016, p.
55). The other social security sub-systems have evolved to provide a similar mix of health
care, pensions and other welfare benefits (see OECD, 2016, p. 55). This means that opting
out of the public schemes in Mexico, or supplementing cover with private insurance, is a
very good indicator of discontent with the state social security system as a whole, given that
these sub-systems encapsulate pensions and other welfare benefits.
6For those unaffiliated and without insurance, there are Red Cross Health Centres in various parts of the
state.
7It is possible some respondents took this to mean to private out of pocket spending. Even if this is the
case, we think this is still a good example of individuals having to opt out and pay for private goods, above
and beyond public provision.
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3.3 Other determinants of tax morale
The literature on the determinants of tax morale is extensive and covers a wide range of
hypotheses (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Slemrod, 2018). Based on this literature, one can
identify several individual-level factors that could potentially explain tax morale (Luttmer
and Singhal, 2014; Slemrod, 2018) and in order to control for these alternative explanations,
we include several variables in our questionnaires and model specifications.
Objective individual attributes, such as socioeconomic status, education, and position
within the labor market, could all shape citizens’ willingness to pay taxes. We use the
NSE/AMAI index to measure socioeconomic status. The NSE/AMAI index was created by
the Mexican Association of Poll Firms (Asociacio´n Mexicana de Agencias de Inteligencia
de Mercado y Opinio´n - AMAI ) to classify households based on a battery of items related
to the quality of housing, patterns of consumption, and welfare. The NSE/AMAI index
is not a measurement of individual income but it provides a standard metric to classify
individuals according to their socioeconomic status. The index is commonly used by the
INEGI and all survey firms in Mexico. Education is measured on a scale from “no educa-
tion” to “post-graduate” education. We measure respondents’ position in the labor market
as a dummy variable, where values of 1 mean that individuals report being employed or
seasonally-employed.
We also include two proxies that attempt to capture an individuals’ beliefs about reci-
procity, or the perception that the government would not squander tax revenue but use it for
the public’s benefit using a 10-points scale in which respondents assessed the effectiveness of
the federal government’s role in fighting poverty and reducing corruption. Specifically, we
asked, “On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is nothing and 10 is a lot, how much money do you
think the government spends trying to help the poor?” and “on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
is not bad at all, how bad is corruption in your country?”8 We also included three indicators
8These two questions are imperfect but useful proxies for whether citizens perceive public goods to be of
good quality and fair.
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to measure how normative attitudes toward redistribution and inequality shape individual
attitudes towards tax evasion. To measure respondents’ perceptions about inequality, we
asked them, on a scale of 1 to 4, how much they agree or disagree that, “the gap between the
income of the bottom 90% of the population and the top 1% is too large.” Meritocracy is a
second and important dimension for any individual assessment about inequality. Therefore,
we also asked our respondents, on the same scale of 1 to 4, if they agreed that “economic
success is due to your family’s social status” and “economic success is due to luck.”
Finally, we assessed the role of deterrence and peer effects on tax compliance and pref-
erences. To measure deterrence, we asked our respondents about their perceived probability
that their neighbors would be audited or prosecuted if they were evading taxes: “Suppose
10 people in your neighborhood are illegally avoiding paying taxes, how many of these 10 do
you think will be caught by authorities?” To measure peer effects – or free-riding – we asked
respondents: “Think of your family members and tell me if you believe: they all pay taxes,
most pay taxes, some pay taxes, or none of them pay taxes.”
4 Analysis of the Tax Morale List Experiment
In this section, we will test our theory of tax morale by analyzing our list experiment. First,
we estimate the average treatment effect to measure support for tax evasion. Table 1 shows
the distributions and average treatment effect for the list experiment.9
The difference-in-means between the groups – the average treatment effect (ATE) – may
be interpreted as the proportion of respondents who support the sensitive item, which in this
case refers to tax evasion. As is shown in Table 1, the mean number of items reported in the
treatment list is 0.1742 higher than that of the control list, indicating that approximately
17% of the sample would have selected the sensitive item (they would not pay their taxes
to save money). This difference-in-means is statistically significant, and it appears to be
externally valid. Official estimates of individual tax evasion in Mexico indicate that personal
9In Tables A.1 and A.2, we include balance tests across a wide range of variables.
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Table 1: Tax Evasion List Experiment: Descriptive Statistics
Control Group Treatment Group
Frequency Proportion Frequency Proportion
0 items 22 4.00% 21 3.82%
1 item 366 66.55% 309 56.18%
2 items 152 27.64% 181 32.91%
3 items 6 1.09% 33 6%
4 items 4 0.73%
NA 4 0.73% 2 0.36%
Total 550 100% 550 100%
Mean 1.260 1.434
ATE = 0.1742 ; p-value = 0.0000046
income tax evasion fluctuated between 15% and 19% between 2004 and 2012 (Fuentes Castro
et al., 2013).
Next, we are interested in the determinants of tax evasion. What kinds of individuals
would be more or less likely to evade? As we argue in Section 2.1, we expect that individuals
with private health insurance will be more willing to evade taxes, and this effect will be
greater than the effect of other alternative explanations like socio-economic status, deterrence
or informational asymmetries.
Table 2 presents multivariate analyses of our list experiment. Each model was estimated
as a linear function of treatment assignment times each of the theoretical covariates. The
interaction terms between treatment assignment and each covariate indicate the difference
between treatment and control groups (the treatment effect) for each unit increase of the
variable. For presentation purposes, Table 2 only shows the coefficients of the interaction
terms. The full output for each model, which includes the coefficients predicting the item
count for the control list, can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
Table 2 presents the multivariate results of the list experiment progressively. Model
1 evaluates the effect of private health insurance on individual willingness to evade taxes.
Every subsequent model includes socio-economic indicators as control variables and private
health insurance as our main variable of interest. Model 2 estimates the effect of additional
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proxies of reciprocity (e.g.perceived government attention to the poor or perceived levels of
corruption). Model 3 includes perceptions of inequality and social fairness. Model 4 assesses
the effect of deterrence mechanisms and model 5 addresses respondents’ reaction to peer
effects. Finally, Model 6 combines all of these variables into a full model of tax evasion.
Table 2: List Experiment, linear estimates - willingness to evade taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Private health insurance 0.257∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.223∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Socio-economic conditions
Socio-economic status 0.002 -0.003 0.028 0.006 -0.013 0.014
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Education 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 -0.006 -0.007
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Employed -0.029 -0.027 -0.078 -0.047 0.000 -0.065
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Reciprocity proxies
Govt. helps the poor 0.008 -0.004
(0.02) (0.02)
Perceived level of corruption 0.008 -0.018
(0.02) (0.03)
Attitudes towards inequality
Inequality gap is too large -0.015 -0.035
(0.05) (0.06)
Success = family status 0.054 0.043
(0.05) (0.06)
Success = hard work -0.071 -0.061
(0.05) (0.05)
Deterrence and peer effects
Audit risk (neighbors) 0.025 0.020
(0.02) (0.02)
Sanction level (neighbors) 0.016 0.039
(0.05) (0.06)
Peer effects (family) 0.071 0.126∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
N 1,004 988 928 909 923 775
R2 0.042 0.053 0.078 0.074 0.051 0.126
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 - Standard errors in parentheses
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As is clear from Table 2, two of our variables significantly predict willingness to evade
taxes: private health insurance and peer effects. In the fully controlled model, 22% more
respondents who have private health insurance would evade paying taxes than their coun-
terparts without private insurance. This effect is robust across all model specifications, and
the magnitude of the effect varies between 19% and 30%. The significant effect persists
even when controlling for socio-economic status, education, and employment. That is, the
effect does not emerge because only rich, educated, or employed individuals are likely to
purchase private health insurance. The effects are also consistent even when controlling for
the respondents’ perceptions of reciprocity, attitudes towards inequality, the effects of deter-
rence mechanisms, and peer compliance effects. In other words, our findings suggest that
individuals definitively view taxes as part of a social contract. If citizens have private health
insurance, then the perceived reciprocal benefit of the social contract will be lower for this
group and they will be more willing to evade taxes.
Additionally, the results presented in Table 2 show that peer effects also have a significant
effect on tax evasion, but not through peer pressure – or the so-called pro-social behavior (Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 2000). If the knowledge that your close network were complaint in their tax
payments made you more compliant through peer pressure, we would find a negative effect
between peer effects and tax evasion. However, the coefficient is significant and positive. In
other words, believing that your close network is obediently paying their taxes makes you
more willing to evade your own payments. This effect more clearly represents free-riding
rather than peer pressure. Jointly with the significant effect of private health insurance,
the full model indicates that individuals are more willing to evade taxes when they perceive
they do not need to pay, either because they do not believe that there is a reciprocal benefit
in doing so as they do not depend on government welfare or because they believe they can
depend on others to pay.10
10The threat of sanction had no effect. It is possible that the threat of punishment for tax evasion is not
fully credible in Mexico City. It is also possible that the questions we asked in the survey were not ideal
proxies to capture this.
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In other words, our analysis of the list experiment consistently suggests that individuals
in Mexico City are 1) highly willing to evade taxes, 2) more willing to evade taxes when they
are independent from state-provided health care services, and 3) more willing to evade taxes
if they perceive their peers obediently comply.
The key point for our argument is that having private health insurance – i.e. the possi-
bility of opting out from the state – makes an individual more likely to evade taxes, above
and beyond their wealth or socioeconomic status. The results presented in Table 2 suggest
that, even when controlling for socio-economic status and position in the labor market, in-
dividuals who are independent from state provision of public goods are still more likely to
evade. These individuals are less likely to evade as free-riders, but rather, as individuals who
actively reject state-provided goods.
But is having private health insurance simply indicative of wealth? Are wealthy citizens
more likely to opt out of publicly-provided health care services and, at the same time, more
willing to evade taxes? If this were the case, the relationship with tax evasion could be easily
explained as self-interest. In the analyses that follow, we examine the relationship between
private health insurance, socio-economic status, and tax evasion more closely. In Table 3,
we can see that about 30% of the respondents report having private health insurance. This
is very similar to official figures, which indicate that, 28% of residents in Mexico City have
some type of private health insurance, or seguro de gastos medicos (INEGI, 2010, 2015).
Table 3: Public or private health insurance by socio-economic status, Mexico City 2017
Socio-Economic Status - AMAI index
ABC+ C D+ D/E Total
Registered to public health services 104 214 144 240 702
(47.49) (69.48 ) (73.10) (83.62) (69.44)
Have private health insurance 115 94 53 47 309
(52.51) (30.52) (26.90) (16.38) (30.56)
Total 219 308 197 287 1,011
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
NOTE: Pearson chi-squared(3) = 78.1726 Pr = 0.000; column percentage in parenthesis.
According to the AMAI Index ABC+ correspond to higher levels of socioeconomic status,
while categories D+, D/E correspond to lower levels of socio-economic status.
Although private health insurance is more prevalent among those with higher levels of
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socio-economic status (category ABC+), a significant proportion of individuals – between
16% and 27% – with lower levels of socio-economic status (categories D+, D/E) also have
access to private health insurance. Private health insurance coverage depends on the level
of insurance taken out (basic or comprehensive), so policies are affordable for individuals
at different levels of income. We can also see that not all individuals with higher levels of
socio-economic status (category ABC+) have private health insurance. In fact, about 48%
of them report using public health care services only. This variation is a clear indication
that many Mexicans choose not to opt out, even if they can easily afford to do so. Overall,
almost 1 in 3 individuals in our sample have access to private health insurance.
In Figure 1, we split the sample between respondents with and without private health
insurance and across different levels of socio-economic status. Figure 1 shows that, in general
and across different levels of socio-economic status, individuals who have private health
insurance are significantly more likely to evade taxes than those without private coverage.
In the right panel, willingness to evade taxes is not statistically significantly for indi-
viduals using public health care services. This effect is consistent across different levels of
socio-economic status with the exception of individuals in category C. In the left panel,
willingness to evade taxes is statistically significant for individuals with private health in-
surance, although this effect is clearly not linear across the different socio-economic groups.
That is, both the very wealthiest and very poorest individuals are likely to evade if they
do have private health coverage. Those in ABC+ with private insurance, have access to
high quality private alternatives. For the very poorest, we think they are forced to purchase
private insurance or pay out of pocket because of deficiencies in the quality of service with
Seguro Popular.
For example, Seguro Popular has a precisely defined positive list of available interventions,
while IMSS and ISSSTE cover all health needs and interventions (OECD, 2016, p.92). At
the same time, 33 per cent of medicines in Seguro Popular cannot be dispensed for lack of
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Figure 1: Willingness to evade taxes by type of health care provider and level of socio-
economic status, Mexico City, 2017. Based on list experiment, linear estimators, Table 2.
that those who are affiliated with Seguro Popular and who purchased private insurance did
so because of deficiencies in service. They were forced to opt out, and hence their tax morale
is lower.11
The results presented in Figure 1 therefore, provide empirical evidence that, no matter
the level of socio-economic status, there is a divergence between those with private health
insurance and those without it. For the most part, it is the willingness, or necessity, to be
independent from state services – rather than wealth – what drives tax evasion.12
11Figure A.2 helps to clarify this effect. This figure suggests that individuals seems to be more willing
to evade: i) when they are formal workers (i.e., their employers make contributions to the IMSS), and they
have enough disposable income to top-up their level of protection with private health insurance; and ii) poor
people that fulfill the requirements to use the services provided by Seguro Popular, but can also buy basic
private health insurance policies (which is not uncommon because there are affordable policies available in
the market).
12Figure A.3 in the Appendix show that this divergence does not depend on the occupational composition
of the different income groups.
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4.1 Evidence from other Latin American Cities
In order to test the external validity of our findings, we test similar models of tax morale using
data from a large-scale regional survey conducted by the Corporacio´n Andina de Fomento
(CAF)- Development Bank of Latin America in 2011 (CAF, 2012). The CAF Survey 2011
is unique in its kind and examines citizen views on tax policy across 17 cities in 9 Latin
American countries. The questionnaire includes reasonably similar or equivalent items to
the ones we use for our list experiment so we are able to provide some validation for our
experimental findings by analyzing non-experimental data in a sample beyond the target
population we studied in Mexico.
For the dependent variable, we use a question on willingness to evade taxes: “is it morally
justifiable to evade taxes?” This question is a useful proxy to evaluate the respondents’
willingness to evade taxes, or at least report a willingness to do so, and allows for a degree of
comparability between our findings in the list experiment with this cross-sectional sample.
We use both the continuous measure of this variable and a binary categorization in the
models below.13
Our main independent variable in the list experiment measures whether or not respon-
dents rely solely on state-provided health coverage or whether they also pay for private
insurance. Unfortunately, the CAF Survey does not include a directly analogous question.
However, it does ask respondents to report if their employers make deductions for private
health insurance plans. We wish to capture how the degree of independence from publicly
provided health care services shapes the beliefs and attitudes of individuals towards taxa-
tion. As such, for all those with private health insurance and who also do not contribute
to a public health scheme, we code as 1, and code all others as 0. Given the limitations
of this measure, we include a second alternative independent variable. This question asked
13All respondents were asked how justifiable it is to evade taxes on a 1 (totally unjustifiable) to 10 (totally
justifiable) scale. For the binary variable, we coded as 1 all those who chose seven and above and coded all
others as 0. The use of a binary dependent variable allows us to model the probability when individuals
strongly believe that tax evasion is justifiable.
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each respondent whether their employer makes any contribution to their pension or social
security funds. Here, all those who answered “no” were coded as 1 and all others as 0. We
think this measure is more useful as it better captures independence from state provided
public goods. It is also a broader measure of independence, in that it includes pensions and
social security, and helps us to assess the validity of our argument above and beyond health
services.
We also included a range of controls to try and proxy for additional hypotheses about
the determinants of tax morale. For socio-economic conditions, we use standard metrics
of individual reported household income, educational attainment, and employment status.
For attitudes towards inequality, we use a question in the survey to measure respondents’
awareness and sensitivity to inequality (salience of the issue) and for deterrence, we use
a question to measure respondents’ perceived probability of being sanctioned by the tax
authority (“if you decided to evade taxes ten times, how many of these ten times would you
be sanctioned?”). For peer effects, we create a combined measure using two questions that
capture respondent’s perceived level of tax compliance among both individual citizens and
firms (e.g. “From 1 to 10, how many of your fellow nationals dutifully pay their taxes?”).
Table 4 presents the results from four different model specifications that regress the
independent variables on the respondents’ perception that it is justifiable to evade taxes. All
models present the estimates from a three-level hierarchical model in which respondents are
nested in cities and then in countries. These are simple random intercept model with single
residuals for each level and intercept terms randomly varying across cities and countries.
Models 1 and 3 are multilevel mixed-effects logit models, while models 2 and 4 are multi-
level mixed effects linear models.14
Across different model specifications, individuals with employer-sponsored, private health
insurance and who also do not contribute to public health schemes, and individuals who are
independent of state pensions and social security, are more likely to find tax evasion morally
14Tables A.5 and A.6 in the appendix present the results of country and city fixed-effects model specifica-
tions.
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Table 4: Is tax evasion morally justifiable? Latin America, 17 cities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Multi-level Multi-level Multi-level Multi-level
logit OLS logit OLS
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Private health insurance 0.479∗∗ 0.056
(0.24) (0.16)
Independence from public goods 0.327∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.09)
Household income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education -0.038 -0.101∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.083∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
ln the labor market -0.943 -0.316 -0.942 0.301
(1.17) (0.90) (1.20) (0.98)
Strong preferences for redistribution 0.294∗∗ 0.147∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.087
(0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08)
Perceived probability of sanction 0.027 -0.045∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.052∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Peer effects 0.324∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Random-effects
Country level (estimate/se) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.619) (0.000) (0.565) (0.000)
City level (estimate/se) 0.796 0.964 0.772 0.966
(0.171) (0.180) (0.174) (0.181)
N 3,225 3,225 2,950 2,950
F − Statistic 41.22∗∗∗ 59.23∗∗∗ 38.91∗∗∗ 70.61∗∗∗
Note: Data from CAF Survey 2011 (CAF, 2012). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
justifiable. This finding is quite consistent with the findings in our list experiment. In other
words, individuals who rely on private health insurance, and who are independent of the
main state provided public goods, are less compelled to pay taxes because they are less
reliant on state-provided services, and they perceive that the reciprocal benefit derived from
the tax contract is lower.
Similar to our findings from our list experiment (see Figure 1), this effect is insensitive to
changes in income. We estimated a model including the multiplicative interaction between
employer-sponsored, private insurance and reported income (see Table A.8 in the Appendix)
and find that the level of reported income does not affect tax morale among those with
private insurance.
Also, consistent with our findings in the list experiment, the estimates for peer effects
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are positive and statistically significant across all models. This indicates that individuals
are more willing to evade taxes if they perceive that their peers are complying obediently.
This suggests that higher perceived levels of peer compliance triggers free-riding incentives
among the respondents. Like in the list experiment, this evidence indicates that ‘voluntary
compliance’ (or ‘voluntary cooperation’) is inherently fragile in Latin America because in-
dividuals behave like income-maximizing free riders, and when they observe that others are
contributing, they try to minimize their contributions to public finances (Fischbacher and
Gachter, 2010).
We also find evidence that opting out is contingent on state capacity. In Table A.7 in
the Appendix, we estimate the joint effect of opting out together with different indicators of
state capacity. Once again, these models show that private health insurance has a positive
and significant effect on the willingness to evade taxes; but they also show that, at higher
levels of state capacity, individuals with private insurance are less likely to opt out relative
to those with private health insurance in states with lower levels of state capacity. In other
words, increasing levels of state capacity attenuate the effect of opting out on tax morale.
Finally, the results presented in Table 4 suggest that tax morale is lower among individu-
als who perceive that inequality is a serious problem and those who have strong preferences
for redistribution. This demonstrates that attitudes towards redistribution and preferences
for redistribution matter for tax compliance; consequently, more progressive tax schedules
could boost tax morale. The results presented in Table A.8 also show that the effect of
private health insurance is insensitive to changes in preferences for redistribution.
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5 Concluding remarks
At the heart of the social contract is an agreement that the state will provide for its citizens
through public goods and that citizens will contribute what they can to help the state to
function. However, in many countries, this reciprocal contract appears to be fractured.
What determines tax morale in low-capacity states, where public goods are often considered
inadequate and where norms of tax compliance are low? We argue that, in such contexts,
many individuals opt out of the social contract. That is, they prefer to substitute state-
provided goods for private providers, rather than pay for public goods through taxes or
free-ride to receive those goods. Specifically, citizens are unlikely to pay taxes if they have
private health insurance. For this group, their perception of the reciprocal benefit that they
will receive from paying taxes will be lower as they opt for a non tax-funded health system.
Consequently, the willingness of this group to evade taxes will be higher relative to other
Latin American citizens.
We test this argument through an analysis of an original survey experiment in Mexico
City. Mexico, with its notoriously low tax compliance and weak conditions for tax morale,
is an ideal context to study this question. The methodological challenge in answering this
question is measuring tax morale in an unbiased way, given that individuals have several
incentives to lie or misrepresent their willingness to pay taxes. It is highly plausible that they
would under-report their willingness to illegally evade taxes and over-report their willingness
to pay taxes that help the poor. Therefore, we conducted a survey that included a list
experiment to measure tax morale and alleviate concerns of social desirability bias.
We find that tax morale is, in fact, quite low. Willingness to evade taxes is high - around
17%. Controlling for key variables, we find that evasion increases among individuals who
have bought themselves independence from the welfare state. And when we examine this
contention with a larger cross-national dataset, the results are very similar. More traditional
expectations of reciprocity do not significantly impact the willingness to evade taxes. Upon
closer examination, we find that those individuals at the very highest and very lowest ranges
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of socio-economic status choose, or are forced, to substitute state-provided health care for
private providers. Across this economic stratum, those who choose not to opt out are unlikely
to evade taxes. We contend that opting out is a product of preferences about public-goods,
and not of social class or demographic self-interest.
Therefore, in order to mend the social contract at the level of the citizen, it is important
to mend the social contract at the level of the state. Citizens need to perceive that state-
provided goods are worth their while, relative to private providers, in order to contribute
to the tax system. In Latin America, where the quality and efficiency of state-provided
public goods varies widely both between and within countries, then this is a real problem.
Governments need to provide public goods fairly and efficiently and these goods must be
perceived as being at least of comparable quality to equivalent private services. Only then
will tax morale across Latin America improve.
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Table A.1: Balance Across Treatment and Control Groups: Variables in Model
Measure Categories Treated Control χ2 Test
N 550 550 NA




SES (AMAI) ABC+ 19.88% 23.86% χ2 = 3.6
C 31.38% 29.36% df = 3
D+ 20.86% 17.80% p-value = 0.3
D/E 27.88% 28.98%
Education None to Primary 4.55% 4.75% χ2 = 4.5
Preparatory 35.64% 35.04% df = 4
Secondary 28.55% 24.45% p-value = 0.3
Technical 14.73% 14.96%
University + 16.55% 20.80%









Table A.2: Balance Across Treatment and Control Groups: Types of Employment
Measure Treated Control χ2 Test





























List Experiments: Full Output
Table A.3: Multivariate Analysis of Tax Evasion List Experiment, Linear Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Difference in mean numbers of items between treatment and control lists:
Treatment dummy 0.110 0.039 0.021 −0.084 0.032 −0.209
(0.209) (0.308) (0.312) (0.281) (0.260) (0.468)
Treat*Private healthcare 0.257∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.223∗∗
(0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.092) (0.092) (0.095)
Treat*SES 0.002 −0.003 0.028 0.006 −0.013 0.014
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043)
Treat*Education 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 −0.006 −0.007
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Treat*Employed −0.029 −0.027 −0.078 −0.047 0.0003 −0.065
(0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.085) (0.085) (0.090)
Treat*Govt. helps poor 0.008 −0.004
(0.021) (0.024)




Treat*Success=family status −0.054 −0.043
(0.052) (0.058)
Treat*Success=hard work 0.071 0.061
(0.047) (0.051)
Treat*Audit risk 0.025 0.020
(0.016) (0.018)
Treat*Sanction level 0.016 0.039
(0.052) (0.056)
Treat*Peer effects 0.071 0.126∗∗
(0.049) (0.053)
Mean number of items in control list
Private healthcare −0.030 −0.008 −0.028 −0.038 −0.004 0.011
(0.061) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066)
SES 0.036 0.041 0.041 0.045 0.043 0.064∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
Education 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.012
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Employed 0.003 −0.016 0.024 0.007 −0.032 −0.013
(0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.062)
Govt. helps the poor −0.001 0.007
(0.015) (0.016)
Perceived corruption −0.040∗∗ −0.037∗∗
(0.017) (0.018)
Inequality gap 0.097∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.035) (0.039)
Success = family status −0.007 −0.003
(0.036) (0.040)
Success = hard work 0.038 0.041
(0.033) (0.035)
Audit risk 0.010 0.014
(0.011) (0.012)
Sanction level 0.067∗ 0.047
(0.037) (0.039)
Peer effects 0.009 −0.003
(0.035) (0.037)
Constant 1.048∗∗∗ 1.375∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗
(0.150) (0.217) (0.219) (0.201) (0.187) (0.324)
Observations 1,004 988 928 909 923 775
R2 0.042 0.053 0.078 0.074 0.051 0.126
Note: Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Alternative specifications of list experiment
In this section, we turn to alternative specifications of the multivariate analysis of the list
experiment. The traditional way to analyze list experiments is a simple difference in means,
in which the number of items is estimated as a linear function of treatment assignment. In
order to conduct multivariate analysis, covariates are interacted with treatment assignment,
allowing us to see the proportion of respondents selecting the sensitive item for a discrete
change in the independent variable.
The difference-in-means estimator is the most traditional approach, but recent advance-
ments to list experiment analysis have leveraged additional information available in the list
experiment response distribution to conduct multivariate analysis. The maximum likelihood
estimator (MLreg) is the most efficient of these new techniques, relying on responses at the
extreme values (0 and the maximum number of items) of the response distribution, assuming
that these data represent truthful responses, and modeling support for the sensitive item as
partially missing data. Given the noise traditionally found around list experiment estimates,
the more efficient MLreg is an attractive alternative to the difference-in-means estimator.
Unfortunately, we are unable to analyze our data using MLreg, as the procedure is
computationally unstable for our list experiment. This is not entirely surprising, given
recent research on MLreg (see Ahlquist, 2014, 2018; Blair et al., 2018). Ahlquist (2014,
2018) examines the estimator’s sensitivity to various forms of non-strategic error and finds
that the estimator’s computational stability is quite fragile, especially when compared to the
difference-in-means estimator.
We believe that the estimator fails to compute because of the relatively high number of
respondents who selected 0 items (∼4% in each group). This might be indicative of “bottom
bias” (Ahlquist 2016), a type of non-strategic measurement error in which respondents pro-
vide a response of 0 rather than providing the number of items they would consider. While
it is possible that respondents would not be willing to consider any of the baseline items
to save money, we find it unlikely that they would even not be willing to consider spending
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less money on groceries. An alternative explanation is that respondents simply stated that
their answer was 0 without engaging in the question. In this case, respondents are not lying
in order to conceal their support for the sensitive item; they are simply satisficing. In this
case, Ahlquist (2014)’s Monte Carlo experiments suggest that a list experiment such as ours
(with a medium prevalence sensitive item and some degree of “bottom-biased” non-strategic
error) would result not be computationally stable between 10%-15% of the time. The most
recent version of MLreg includes new estimators that are robust to non-strategic measure-
ment error, but they only address “uniform” or “top-biased” error, not “bottom-biased”
error.
Nevertheless, Imai developed an alternative estimator, the non-linear least squares esti-
mator (NLSreg), which makes fewer distributional assumptions than MLreg. Consequently,
it is more robust than MLreg, but less efficient, and is the recommended technique to use in
instances of non-strategic measurement error (Blair et al., 2018). Our results, presented in
Table A.4, indicate that the NLS estimates are comparable to the OLS estimates in terms
of sign and significance.
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Table A.4: Multivariate Analysis of List Experiment
OLS NLS
b/(se) b/(se)
Sensitive Item (Difference between treatment and control lists)








Govt. helps poor −0.004 −0.036
(0.024) (0.153)




Success=family status −0.043 −0.111
(0.061) (0.365)
Success=hard work 0.061 0.487
(0.055) (0.363)
Audit risk 0.020 0.191
(0.020) (0.118)
Sanction level 0.039 0.130
(0.058) (0.354)













Govt. helps poor 0.007 0.010
(0.014) (0.019)




Success=family status −0.003 −0.002
(0.035) (0.046)
Success=hard work 0.041 0.057
(0.034) (0.046)
Audit risk 0.014 0.019
(0.012) (0.015)
Sanction level 0.047 0.066
(0.036) (0.048)




Note: Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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In order to compare effect sizes across the OLS and NLS estimators, we compute predicted
probabilities for each. In Figure A.1, we present the predicted probability of supporting tax
evasion for those with private insurance (left panel) and without private insurance (right
panel). Figure A.1 demonstrates that both groups of respondents would be willing to evade
taxes, but that willingness increases (by roughly 22% points, as indicated in Table A.4
and Table 3 in the main body) among those with private insurance. In comparing the
two estimators, it is clear that the willingness to evade taxes is highly comparable for the
linear and non-linear least squares models, and the NLS estimator only has slightly smaller
confidence intervals.
Figure A.1: Predicted probabilities of the willingness to evade taxes: Comparing OLS and
NLS estimations
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Alternative Specifications and Measures
Table A.5: Private Health Insurance and Attitudes towards Tax Evasion, Country Fixed-
Effects Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country FE logit Country FE Country FE logit Country FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Private health insurance 0.504∗∗ 0.107
(0.23) (0.17)
Independence from public goods 0.322∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.09)
Household income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education -0.044 -0.115∗∗∗ -0.033 -0.100∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
ln the labor market -0.937 -0.475 -0.967 0.057
(1.15) (0.93) (1.18) (1.01)
Strong preferences for redistribution 0.235∗ 0.067 0.206 0.006
(0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08)
Perceived probability of sanction 0.005 -0.069∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.078∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Peer effects 0.360∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
N 3,225 3,225 2,950 2,950
Note: Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Private Health Insurance and Attitudes towards Tax Evasion, City Fixed-Effects
Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
City FE logit City FE City FE logit City FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Private health insurance 0.514∗∗ 0.067
(0.24) (0.16)
Independence from public goods 0.319∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.09)
Household income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education -0.038 -0.101∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.082∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
ln the labor market -0.990 -0.321 -0.953 0.305
(1.17) (0.90) (1.20) (0.98)
Strong preferences for redistribution 0.301∗∗ 0.150∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.091
(0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08)
Perceived probability of sanction 0.032 -0.044∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.050∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Peer effects 0.312∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
N 3,225 3,225 2,902 2,950
Note: Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Private insurance, tax evasion, and state capacity
Table A.7: Private Health Insurance, Attitudes towards Tax Evasion, and State Capacity.
Latin America, 17 cities. Multi-level HLM Random Intercept Models
Dependent variable: tax evasion is justifiable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Private health insurance 0.463* 6.602* 0.473** 2.293** 0.477** 3.458***
(0.24) (3.667) (0.24) (1.06) (0.24) (0.99)
State capacity indicators




Tax burden as % GDP 0.011 0.018
(0.03) (0.03)
Private health*tax burden -0.069*
(0.04)
Income taxation as % GDP 0.043 0.073
(0.12) (0.12)
Private health*income taxation -0.499***
(0.17)
Individual-level factors
Household income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education -0.036 -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038 -0.038
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
In the labor market -0.934 -0.915 -0.943 -0.945 -0.942 -0.930
(1.17) (1.16) (1.17) (1.16) (1.17) (1.17)
Strong preferences for redistribution 0.291** 0.285** 0.293** 0.285** 0.294** 0.281**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Perceived sanction 0.027 0.021 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.028
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peer effects 0.326*** 0.327*** 0.324*** 0.322*** 0.324*** 0.320***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Random-effects
Country level (estimate/se) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.489) (0.441) (0.564) (0.501) (0.5282) (0.721)
City level (estimate/se) 0.769 0.764 0.792 0.791 0.796 0.821
(0.167) (0.166) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.174)
N 3,225 3,225 3,225 3,225 3,225 3,225
F − Statistic 73.63*** 73.93*** 76.99*** 78.58*** 75.64*** 80.84***
Note: Immunizations coverage (POL3) refers to the percentage of surviving infants who receive the 3rd
dose of polio containing vaccine as estimated by WHO-UNICEF. Tax burden as % GDP as calculated by the
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT).
Income taxation as % GDP includes Personal Income Tax and Corporate Income Tax as as calculated
by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations









Private health insurance 0.479∗∗ 0.349 0.679∗∗
(0.24) (0.30) (0.31)
Household income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education -0.038 -0.038 -0.037
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
In the labor market -0.943 -0.944 -0.933
(1.17) (1.17) (1.17)
Strong preferences for redistribution 0.294∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.327∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Perceived probability of sanction 0.027 0.027 0.026
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)







Country level (estimate/se) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.619) (0.622) (0.610)
City level (estimate/se) 0.796 0.793 0.793
(0.171) (0.171) (0.171)
N 3,225 3,225 3,225
F − Statistic 41.22∗∗∗ 41.46∗∗∗ 41.98∗∗∗
Note: Data from CAF Survey 2011. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
50













Social Security Sub-System Social Security Sub-System
Private Insurance Public Schemes Only
IMSS ISSSTE PEMEX, SEDENA, etc.
Seguro Popular Clinicas Mexico City None
Figure A.2: Willingness to evade taxes by type of health care provider and access to different










Position in the labor market Position in the labor market
Private Insurance Public Schemes Only
Working Seasonal worker Looking for a job
Student Homemaker Retired
Figure A.3: Willingness to evade taxes by type of health care provider and occupation,
Mexico City, 2017. Based on list experiment, linear estimators, Table 2.
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